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PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN DYADIC INTERACTIONS: INFLUENCES OF
COOPERATION AND COMPETITION ON THIRD PERSON REPRESENTATION
OF MOVEMENT
MICHAEL H. SUMMERS
ABSTRACT
Similar processes between a third person representation and a first person representation
may be at work in understanding the limitations of another. These processes may lead to
errors in estimating the abilities of another by anchoring those estimates to one’s own
abilities. A study designed to test how interactive conditions may mediate these
processes. It was hypothesized that, due to an increase in interdependence, an individual
would show a higher degree of difference between his or her own abilities and those of
another when cooperating, compared to non-interactive conditions. It was also
hypothesized that competition, due in part to a lack of diffusion of responsibility, would
show significantly higher differences than those individuals cooperating. The study
included a physical task designed to create conditions of cooperation, competition, and a
non-interactive condition between two individuals. One individual in each condition was
given weighted gloves to simulate a handicap. Following the interaction, participants
estimated the amount of effort it would take for themselves and the amount of effort it
would take for the other person to complete a number of simple actions that were
designed to interact with the handicap by either being harder to complete, easier to
complete, or no difference in effort to complete when wearing the handicap. Results
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show significant differences in effort between oneself and the other only in relation to
being artificially handicapped, with the handicapped individual seeing certain actions as
more difficult for themselves while wearing the handicap while the non-handicapped
individual sees the same actions as easier for themselves while not wearing the handicap.
Also, a marginally significant interaction was observed between being artificially
handicapped and interaction group with non-handicapped individuals seeing a greater
degree of difference between themselves and the handicapped individual in the
competitive interaction as opposed to the cooperative interaction. Results also showed
many methodological problems in study design, including difficulty in creating the noninteractive condition and creating a list of actions that would be easier to complete with
the handicap. Methodological issues are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 Introduction
To understand the behavior of others and effectively interact with them to anticipate how they might react to something you say, for example - one
must have insight into what they believe, think and feel and understand
how these mental states relate to behavior (Mason & Macrae, 2008,
p.219).
As the above quote demonstrates, the importance of being able to see a situation
from another person’s perspective cannot be underestimated in social situations. It is a
vital component for adaptively navigating within a complex social world. Take the act of
negotiation as an example: to create a successful negotiation for all parties involved, each
party must be willing to understand what the other party desires, what their resources are,
and what they may be willing to give up in order to achieve those desires. If any party
within that negotiation cannot place himself or herself in the role of the other party, then
the chances of mutual benefit decline. If we concentrate only on our own goals then the
chances of any mutually beneficial compromise lessens.
While recognition of another’s differing mental and/or emotional states is a
complex feat of cognition in and of itself, we should also realize the importance of
understanding the physical abilities and limitations of another person within social
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interaction as well. As a species, humans are physical in nature as well as mental.
Historically, interactions between two individuals often enough involve some degree of
physicality, even if it just be talking face to face. With a long history in place that
necessitated physicality in interaction, would it not make sense for some level of
evolutionary importance to be placed on the ability to cognitively process the limitations
of another’s physical abilities? In essence it should also be important for us to know who
we can rely on or how hard we will have to work when competing against another. Thus
there may be a greater need to be able to mentally perceive the abilities and limitations of
those other people we are cooperating with or competing against, more so than
individuals we are not interacting with.
The current research was designed in an attempt to elucidate possible differences
in the mental representation of another’s physical abilities as a result of manipulation of
the social interaction of the two individuals. Namely, it was hypothesized that by
artificially creating conditions of cooperation and competition between two individuals,
as well as a non-direct interaction condition between two individuals, differences in
ability of one individual to mentally represent the physical abilities of a second individual
would become evident. An artificial physical handicap was used to explore possible
differences in cognitive representation of another person. The general hypothesis was
examined: In an interaction between two people, when one has been physically
handicapped, the degree of mental representation of the handicap when estimating the
other’s physical abilities will be influenced by the type of interaction the two individuals
share. Specifically, significant differences were hypothesized to exist in handicap
integration between conditions of cooperation, competition, and a non-interactive control
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condition. The aforementioned significant differences were hypothesized to show that
individuals operating under a competitive paradigm would rate basic movements related
to the artificial handicap as either much harder if the handicap would hinder said
movements or much easier if the handicap would, in fact, aid in said movements than
those in a cooperative paradigm or a non-interactive paradigm. The cooperative paradigm
was hypothesized to rate said movements as significantly harder or easier (again,
depending on the interaction between the handicap and the movement) than the noninteractive condition
The following background information should make the reasoning behind the
hypothesis clear. Starting with a definition of perspective taking, as well as a brief
background on possible processes of perspective taking, we will examine how these
processes may be influenced by social interaction. The discussion will include the
possibilities of errors of representation of others, namely how it is possible to see another
individual as similar to the self, as well as how it may be possible to overcome these
errors through such interactions as direct cooperation and competition.
1.2 Perspective Taking
To take the perspective of another, or to place oneself in the role of another,
requires distinguishing between one’s own - and another’s – beliefs, values, intentions,
and desires (Converse, Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2008). One must be able to understand that
the way one sees the world is not necessarily the way that another does. Even young
children exhibit the ability to think about how another sees the world; research suggests
that a sophisticated level of reasoning about the mental states of others is reached
between the ages of three and five (Wellman & Gelman, 1993).
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Before continuing, it may be helpful to review perspective taking. Overall,
perspective taking itself can fall under the theory of mind which “refers to a person’s
ability to understand another person’s mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and
intentions; most broadly the term denotes the ability to take another’s perspective”
(Hynes, Baird, & Grafton, 2006, p.374). One of the most recognizable facets about the
definition of theory of mind is the ability to understand that what one knows may differ
from what another knows (Converse et al., 2008); however, if we follow the broad
definition of putting oneself in the perspective of another, physical ability logically
comes into play as well.
Another concept regarding perspective taking is worth mentioning - secondary
representation, which may involve mental simulation of another person’s perspective.
Secondary representation concerns maintaining another’s perspective through mental
images, even if our own perception of the situation is vastly different (Herold & Akhtar,
2008). By holding our own beliefs as to how the world works (as judged by the
integration of our perceptions into a workable schema of the world) while simultaneously
perceiving other viewpoints, we can come to understand the way in which another sees a
situation (Herold & Akhtar, 2008). Perhaps the best example of secondary representation
in regards to the current study may be a literal interpretation of “the blind man and the
elephant” analogy often used in arguments of religion. If we, having full sight, come
across an elephant we recognize it as an elephant. However if a blind man comes across
an elephant, the spot where he comes into tactile contact with the beast may lead him to a
different interpretation of what the beast is. For example, should he only grab and pull the
poor creature’s trunk, he may interpret the beast as a very large and muscular snake. We
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must use secondary representation of the blind man’s senses to understand how such a
mistake can be made. While there is no argument against the importance of
understanding intention as well as other mental states, it is the actual representation of
another’s physical abilities that plays a crucial role in the current research.
How does perspective taking work within the physical realm? Take, for example,
a study by Anquetil and Jeannerod (2007). In their study, when individuals were asked to
either imagine grasping an object themselves (a first person perspective) or to imagine
someone facing them grasping an object (a third person representation), very similar
times to imagine the action were obtained in both conditions. Furthermore, when
constraints were placed upon individuals, a difficult grasping condition in this example,
the constraint, as evidenced by slower times in the imagined grasping of the object,
applied equally to both the first person and the third person perspectives (Anquetil &
Jeannerod, 2007). Anquetil and Jeannerod (2007) offer an explanation, stating that it is
possible that “subjects in fact performed the same action from two perspectives, as if they
had mentally rotated themselves so as to superimpose with the virtual subject facing
them” (p. 127). According to this explanation, individuals in this study appeared to have
used a first person perspective as a basis for creating a third person representation for
completing the task.
When the above results are examined under Goldman’s (1989) simulation theory,
which Frith (2002) defines as: “the idea that we ‘read’ the mental states of others by
imaging ourselves in their circumstances and discovering what this feels like” (p. 485)1, it
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It should be noted that, in the same article, Frith (2002) actually proposes the opposite
as true; to quote: “We start with a representation of the other person’s mental state and,
from that we predict what they will do” (p.485).
5

may be possible that participants, in essence, used themselves as the template for the
abilities of the hypothetical “other” in this situation. While template might be an
overstatement, the idea still occurs that, when thinking of another person in a physical
sense, one whose abilities we are not able to judge, we may use our own abilities as the
basis for estimating those of another person.
1.3 Similar processes for first person and third person representation
Our survival in a social world is dependent, at least in part, upon our ability to
separate our representations of ourselves from others (Decety & Sommerville, 2003).
How does this representation of others occur? At the least, the Anquetil and Jeannerod
(2007) study suggest that using another’s perspective to understand their actions may, in
fact, be quite similar to representing the action as if we were to do it ourselves. Anquetil
and Jeannerod (2007) are not the only ones to suggest such a similarity. Ames, Jenkins,
Banaji, and Mitchell (2008) suggest that the same cognitive processes generally used for
self-introspection are used when individuals attempt to take another’s perspective. Most
pertinent to this study, however is that Vazire and Robins (2004), in discussing adaptive
functions in argument for the development of self, argue that one uses the self as a way to
predict, understand, and manipulate others, through the projection of our own conscious
mental states onto others. Voland (2007) goes so far as to suggest that “one knows one’s
self best and projects this knowledge onto others, to achieve a reliable understanding of
others that is suitable for everyday purposes” (p. 447). While the Voland statement may
go too far, there remains the suggestion that information about others utilizes the same
cognitive processes as information about oneself.

6

Information processing theory, which is used to describe how information from
constant environmental inputs flows into the processing system and eventually into
memory outputs (Spink & Cole, 2007), may be of use in explanation. Spink and Cole
(2007) suggest that stimuli that are not familiar to an individual would take a longer
processing time as there would be little to match that information to that is already
encoded within memory. It is possible that any novel information we receive may be
attempted to be paired, at least initially, with self-referential information. For example,
Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) suggest that “when students encounter a list of
characteristics of a psychopathological state (e.g., in an introductory psychology lecture),
they tend to interpret (and attempt to remember) these by referring them to their own
views of self” (p. 678). It may be that as the child grows, and gathers more knowledge
about him or herself, he or she may be more able to relate to others through interpretation
of his or her own previous actions and feelings, which may activate the self-schema when
the child is watching another. Such can be seen in Davis, Conklin, Smith, and Luce’s
(1996) suggestion that a common role-taking strategy of putting oneself in the situation
of the other and asking “How would I feel? What would I think?” (p.722). Further
evidence may be seen in the proposed cognitive-developmental model that states that a
single conceptual system represents both our own and others goal-directed actions
(Decety & Sommerville, 2004).
Evidence for the aforementioned cognitive model of single conceptual system for
goal-directed actions of oneself and others (Decety & Sommerville, 2004) can be seen in
neuroimaging showing activation in the same neural network during observation of the
performance of others as well as self-generated actions (Anquetil & Jeannerod, 2007).
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We can consider such activation part of the mirror neuron system, basic movement
neurons that will show activity when observing activity or a specific behavior from
another, even if one does not reproduce that action or behavior (Kosslyn & Moulton,
2009). The mirror neuron system not only represents the observed activity, but it also
represents that activity as part of a goal-oriented behavior (Voland, 2007), in that it
represents not only the action itself, but the end goal associated with the action (Decety &
Stevens, 2009). According to neuroimaging studies, it appears that close to 90% of the
same areas of the brain that are activated during an individual’s actual physical motion
are also activated during that same individual’s visual imagining of the same motion
(Kosslyn & Moulton, 2009).
If individuals take into account physical possibility and level of expertise, just as
actual physical motion that is difficult and novel would take longer durations, so too
would mental representations of the same physical motion show longer durations. Fitts’
law, stated to be one of the most well-established theories in psychology (Grosjean,
Shiffrar, & Knoblich, 2007), demonstrates the ratio of time to difficulty well. Fitts’ Law
states that the width of two targets and the distance between them directly relates to the
time necessary to move between them as quickly and accurately as possible (Fitts, 1954).
Therefore it would take a longer duration of time for an individual to accurately move his
or her finger from one thin object to another when there is a fair distance between them,
as compared to when the objects are thicker (thus easier to touch) or closer together.
Decety and Jeannerod (1995) have demonstrated that Fitts’ Law is followed for mental
simulation of movement just as it is for the actual physical motion itself. For another
example, Kosslyn and Moulton (2009) state that how an individual is directed to take
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hold of an object has a direct effect on how long it takes for an individual to mentalize, or
imagine, grasping that object. In fact, it has gone so far as to suggest that the time it takes
to perform a physical movement is not significantly different from the time it takes to
perform that same movement mentally (Beilock & Lyons, 2009).
If one is attempting to match novel social information regarding another’s
abilities, and if one is processing this information through self-referential processes, then,
all things being equal, the level of difficulty one has doing a specific action should
directly relate to the perceived level of difficulty another has doing that particular action.
However, in most aspects of daily life, all things are seldom equal. One possible
influence in the perceived difficulty of another completing a task may be the type of
interaction the two individuals share.
1.4 Interactions
The crux of the current study relies on the theory that the way in which someone
interacts with another person will mediate the reliance on self-information in utilizing
self-information in judging the abilities of another person. The focus of this study will
involve non-interactive conditions, cooperation, and competition.
1.4.1 Non-Interactive Conditions
In both developmental science and social psychology, it has been suggested that
humans can, at times, view another as similar to oneself (Decety & Sommerville, 2004).
While this error is not all-encompassing in all social situations, it is prevalent enough that
an entire class of perspective taking errors have been identified where an individual
substitutes his or her own perspective onto the other, and then fails to take into account
discriminating information into their mental model (Mason & Macrae, 2008). These
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kinds of errors can be seen in a study from Ramenzoni, Riley, Shockley, and Davis
(2008). In the study, Ramenzoni et al. (2008), individuals were asked to estimate their
own jumping ability by way of height reached, as well as the jumping ability of a
confederate. After initial estimations, participants had weights placed around his or her
ankles and were forced to walk for a period of time before returning to estimate jumping
height again. Confederates received no weights, and thus were unencumbered. What was
discovered was that the weights on the participant lowered their estimation of the
confederate’s jumping ability when the participant made their second estimation. In other
words, participants in the Ramenzoni et al. (2008) experiment failed to take into account
that the other individual had not been fitted with weights, and would not be encumbered
in their jumping ability. It can be argued that they substituted their own perspective of
that moment in place of the confederate’s separate reality. Unfortunately, due to the
natural tendency of an individual to want to see oneself, or the group one belongs to, as
better than a competitor (see Turner, 1975 for a review), those different estimations may
be a result of this tendency, and not a focus on heuristic use of oneself in the estimation
of the other. Also there are other explanations beyond social comparison, including the
degree to which the confederates in this study exhibited fatigue and boredom within their
roles; unfortunately, without actual measures of such confounds reported in the article,
we can only assume that such was accounted for. However, examining the mean
estimates from the Ramenzoni et al. (2008) study, we do see that while estimations made
by the weighted individuals for the confederate were lower compared to unweighted
individuals, those estimations were still higher than weighted individual’s jumping
estimations for themselves. Their own hindrance appears to have been taken into account
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and participants seemed to realize that they would be worse at jumping. While such a
realization does not necessarily counteract this natural tendency to see oneself as better, it
does highlight the possibility that heuristic use is in play and warrants investigation. As
argued above, it is entirely possible that participants substituted their own perspective of
that moment in place of the confederate’s separate reality, relying on an “egocentric bias”
(Decety & Sommerville, 2003, p.529) to form an opinion of the other’s ability through
judgments of their, the participant’s, own abilities and processes.
This “egocentric bias” (Decety & Sommerville, 2003, p.529) is often seen in
ambiguous information and ambiguous situations. Green and Sedikides (2001) show
support for this bias with evidence that individuals are more likely to believe a character
will act more in line with their own self-schema when information about the character is
lacking.
In such evidence we can see how one may substitute one’s own abilities when
estimating the abilities of another, at least in what can be labeled a non-interactive
condition. Only a small degree of interaction between the participant and the confederate
existed in the Ramenzoni et al. (2008) study, which may have led to ambiguous, or, at the
very least, vague information about the confederate. With such limited knowledge, a
third-person representation may be difficult to create. If this theory holds we may often
expect to see an individual substitute elements of his or her own perspective of
themselves, or the situation for another person, when there is little to no interaction
between the two.
There is, of course, another side to discuss. Just the fact that there is another
person may be enough to modulate the degree of the engagement of the egocentric bias in
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third-person representation. Take, for example, a study by Norton, Frost, and Ariely
(2007). In this study, participants were shown a list of randomly selected traits, one at a
time, which a supposed hypothetical individual possessed. When participants viewed the
first trait shown as dissimilar to themselves, they were more likely to find fewer overall
similarities with this hypothetical person (Norton, Frost, & Ariely, 2007). If a physical
handicap, or lack thereof, is the first thing known about another individual, we can see
how such a situation may challenge a heuristic reliance on an egocentric basis for third
person representation. In other words, if the first thing we notice about a person is that he
is in a wheelchair, we might not be so ready to use ourselves as a basis for the other’s
abilities when imagining or estimating what this person can physically do. Thus, even in
a completely non-interactive condition, we would not expect a full substitution of one’s
own abilities in estimating another’s (e.g. an individual believing “it takes me this much
effort to do this, it must take him the same amount”), but perhaps an anchoring of the
estimates of that other to oneself.
Complete non-interactive conditions are not the crux of social life. When
interaction exists between two individuals, what difference can the type of interaction
make in overcoming this possible egocentric bias in representing others? The answer may
well depend on the type of interaction between the two individuals. While there are many
degrees and types of interactions that could influence representation, in this study we will
focus on cooperation and competition.
1.4.2 Cooperation
Cooperative interactions may be viewed as a function of group membership, in
that individuals cooperating towards a single goal may be seen as individual members of
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a group with a shared goal. As Toleman (1943) suggested “A common goal animating the
group and giving it a feeling of mission will increase the readiness to identify” (p.143).
How does cooperation relate to perspective taking abilities? To understand, first we must
briefly examine how the concept of the self works within groups.
Brewer (1991) suggests that the concept of self is not set, but can expand and
contract as the situation demands. Therefore, in situations where one must see oneself as
a member of a group, a more collective identity should overshadow the individual
identity (Brewer, 1991). The activation of the collective self, then, should enhance the
ability to access shared characteristics of oneself and the group (Brewer & Gardner,
1996). It is possible that a reliance on heuristics may lead to high degrees of attribution
bias, where an individual may think “other members of the group are like me on this trait,
then they should be like me on that trait as well.” It has been suggested that individuals
may confuse his or her own traits, or set of traits, with those of close in-group members,
or intimate relationships (Decety & Sommerville, 2003). It is possible the same thing
may happen in loosely knit, ad hoc groups. These ad-hoc groups may often contain a
similar level of ambiguity as seen in non-interactive conditions, especially where the
participants have little knowledge, or little need of that knowledge, of each other outside
the group confines. Thus, while the cognitive processes for confusing one’s traits for that
of a group member’s may in fact be different between close-knit groups and ad-hoc
groups, similar results may manifest themselves. It is quite possible that, due to the lack
of information, an individual within such an ad-hoc group may be using a group
prototype when there is not enough information on the group to create an accurate
prototype. Hogg and Reid (2006) define prototype as “fuzzy sets, not checklists, of
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attributes (e.g., attitudes and behaviors) that deﬁne one group and distinguish it from
other groups. These category representations capture similarities among people within the
same group and differences between groups” (p. 10). Hogg and Reid (2006) also state
that following the “metacontrast principle” (p.10), prototypes function in a way to
minimize intragroup differences compared to intergroup differences, meaning one would
want to see the group one belongs to as more of a cohesive body to compare against an
out-group. Without a wealth of information to rely on about the entire ad-hoc group, it is
possible that one may believe oneself as representative of the group and attribute a larger
degree of one’s traits to other group members than in a previously established group
dynamic.
Mood may exacerbate this potential bias. Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Süsser,
(1994) have shown that positive moods may increase stereotyping. It should also be noted
that individuals have been shown to employ a theory of mind when in a positive state
(Converse et al., 2008). If goal completion is relevant to some level of satisfaction,
reaching that completion may result in positive moods and thus a larger chance of
stereotyping. If there is no set group prototype to stereotype to, it is possible that
individuals may default to their own traits and abilities and, to some degree, map those
traits onto other group members. Thus, we can see how it is possible that cooperation
may increase a likelihood of perception taking errors towards an egocentric base,
especially if cooperation results in a positive mood. Of course there is also the opposite
dynamic to consider, failure of goal completion may result in negative mood, and thus
less chance of stereotyping. It is possible that, in a negative interaction, such as failure of

14

a goal, an individual may lay the blame for the dissatisfaction on the other person,
thereby cognitively separating this other from himself or herself.
It is also possible that any shared characteristic of the members of a group may,
by its very existence, create a dichotomy within an individual for representational
purposes. Hamilton and Sherman (1996) suggest that, when processing information
relevant to group members, individuals will more likely base appraisals of group
characteristics on current information rather than make inferences about group attributes.
Hogg and Reid (2006) continue in their review to state that group prototypes are
dependant upon context and will changes with situations and goals, thus if the situation
changes (for example, if an ad-hoc group has reached it’s goal but still must remain
together) characteristics of individual members of the group that were not apparent before
may become more salient. Differences may become highlighted within the individual’s
frame of reference, where the individual may see a member of the group as “like me” in
some aspects and “not like me” in other aspects. So, if there is a large difference in
physical ability between individuals, such a difference may become more salient when
compared to the shared characteristics of the group.
Another possible counteracting agent of egocentric bias in cooperative groups is
group coordination. Achieving group goals involves group coordination, both in simple
interdependence tasks (where behaviors can be mapped out before being put into action)
and in more complex interdependence tasks (where behaviors are much more dependent
upon the momentary situation, making plans of behavior more difficult to create
beforehand) (Larson & Schaumann, 1993). It should be noted, however, that most realworld situations of group coordination fall somewhere between the proposed simple and
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complex interdependence tasks (Larson & Schaumann, 1993). The more complex an
interdependence task, the more an individual group member must pay attention to another
group member’s actions of the moment, so that the individual can adjust his or her own
behavior to better complete the task at hand (Larson & Schaumann, 1993). In doing so
individuals must be aware of other group member’s abilities as related to goal
completion, thus there may be more motivation to cognitively represent the other’s
abilities separately from oneself.
As we can see, cooperation may have different effects upon the how one
perceives another person. When working cooperatively with another person, how one
cognitively processes the abilities of that other person may be tempered towards
ambiguity in more simple interdependence tasks, but, in more complex interdependence
tasks, processing may be tempered towards less ambiguity. If, as Larson and Schaumann
(1993) suggest, most tasks involving group coordination contain elements of both simple
and complex tasks, we would expect to see an individual be less likely to rely on
judgments about his or her own abilities when estimating the abilities of another as there
should be less ambiguity about the other person in the cooperative action when compared
to a non-interactive condition. After an initial interaction with an individual, we should
see less of an anchoring effect and greater differences between estimations of one’s own
abilities and that of another as compared to the non-interactive situations.
1.4.3 Competition
The question “will these estimations of abilities be different between conditions
of cooperation and competition?” should be asked. If we follow the social brain
hypothesis, which states “the main selective pressure among primates lies on generating
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social knowledge about one’s cooperators and competitors and utilizing this knowledge
for one’s own production of strategic behavior…” (Voland, 2007, p.447), then it would
seem beneficial to spare the resources to more accurately represent another and thus have
a better ability to take the other’s perspective equally in both cooperative and competitive
interactions. However, it must be realized that competition is a different type of
interaction than cooperation.
While it may be tempting to view cooperation and competition as different ends
of a continuum, this is not the case. Many of the same processes are at play with both
conditions of cooperation and competition. Both conditions can be expressed in terms of
group membership in that an individual may see himself or herself in a group with the
competitor. Both conditions can also be expressed in terms of motivation, which has been
shown to increase accuracy in perception of others (Neuberg, 1999). For example, in a
study asking half the participants to create an accurate impression of job applicants, thus
motivating a more accurate impression formation, Neuberg (1999) found that participants
formed less biased and more accurate impressions of the applicants, even when these
participants were primed with negative information about the applicants before meeting
them. Participants, through increased motivation, were less likely to rely on previous
information or preset, established, values for their impressions (Neuberg, 1999) If we
assume that one is motivated to reach a goal, and that the process of reaching the goal is
either aided or hindered by others, one may be more motivated to accurately represent
what that other can, or cannot, do.
Considering the above information, what must be asked is what makes
competitive interactions different from cooperative interactions in the realm of perception
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of abilities. Thinking in terms of direct dyadic interactions, while both individuals
involved are reaching towards the same goal in both cooperative and the competitive
interactions, in the competitive interaction alone individuals are looking to reach that goal
quicker than the others. Now, while the above is a simplistic explanation, and it
overshadows inherent drives within individuals that may lead to overt or subtle intragroup competition, it still remains that competition, as a whole, may create a new
variable that is absent in the cooperative interaction that may increase motivation to
further separate the representation of another from oneself.
In direct competitive arrangements, an individual may have no one else to assign
blame but to him or herself for failing to reach the goal if he or she is acting alone. We
may think of this in terms of the diffusion of responsibility theory, which states that
group members are less likely to feel personal responsibility for negative outcomes than
if that person were acting alone (Mynatt & Sherman, 1975). However, the fact that there
may not be anyone else to diffuse the responsibility of failure to isn’t to say that an
individual will voluntarily assume the full brunt of the blame for failure. Self-serving
bias, which is defined by Campbell and Sedikides (1999) as “the explanatory pattern that
involves external attributions (e.g. task difficulty, luck, or uncooperative others) for
outcomes that disfavor the self but internal attributions (e.g. one’s own ability, effort, or
determination) for outcomes that favor the self” (p. 23), will almost certainly be in play in
the situation. It is merely more difficult for an individual to escape some portion of
responsibility for failure in direct competitive interactions than if that individual were
working as part of a group.
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If we think in terms of sexual competition, out of the two representation errors,
i.e., assuming potential mates will see one’s sexual rivals are more or less desirable than
oneself (Hill, 2007), underestimating rivals may be more devastating to achieving
reproduction. However, in order to conserve resources, one would also not wish to
overestimate the rival. With direct competitive interactions heaping more responsibility
upon the individual, it may be that the individual will allow less heuristic use when
representing a direct competitor. It may seem reasonable to extend Decety and Stevens’s
(2009) quote: “It is critical to know what we can physically accomplish in any given
situation, be it flee, fight, eat, or hug” (p. 5) to a direct competitor. When there is any type
of goal at stake, it could very well be just as critical to know what any competitor can
accomplish in a given situation as well as knowledge of one’s own self.
Under such a structure, an individual may be more motivated to produce an
accurate representation of the rival. Does this motivation translate from competition for
mates? If we examine sports psychology, we can see that competition produces other
threats. For example, in a study examining self-efficacy in defeated tennis players, Lane,
Jones, and Stevens (2002) showed a reduction in self-efficacy after the defeat, which can
be viewed as a disruption of psychological homeostasis, or, as Burchfield (1979) defines
it “the maintenance of the normal mood state of an individual at rest” (p. 662). The
disruption of the previous psychological homeostasis does potentially fall under Flannery
and Everly’s (2000) definition of a crisis, though it may in fact be a minor crisis. Crisis or
not, it remains that such an event has the possibility of knocking an individual out of a
homeostatic state and creating stress (Burchfield, 1979). Thus, if an individual seeks to
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avoid stress, he or she may have more motivation to accurately represent another person
when that individual is in direct competition with the other.
It should also be noted that Macrae and Bodenhausen (2000) state that categorical
stereotyping occurs more often when motivation is low. If Macrae and Bodenhausen’s
(2000) statement is true and if competition creates more motivation to accurately perceive
a competitor then we would expect to see less possibility of stereotyping to one’s own
traits, at least when a group prototype is unavailable, even in positive outcomes.
If motivation is higher in the competitive groups, we would expect to see less reliance
upon an egocentric bias in representing the abilities of another, at least for those abilities
relevant to the competition. Due to a reliance solely upon oneself, and also the lack of the
ability to diffuse blame should the outcome be unsatisfactory, motivation for a greater
separation of one’s estimates of one’s own abilities and estimations of that of the
competitor’s may be created. A degree of separation may be a little more difficult to
measure should the competitor be handicapped in some way. Recall the natural tendency
of an individual to desire to see oneself, or the group one belongs to, as better than a
competitor (see Turner, 1975 for a review); it may be expected that any differences seen
in estimation of that other’s ability would be due to that tendency, a heuristic in and of
itself, and not a more detailed cognitive map of the competitor. Luckily, however,
individuals should generally be more than an overarching caricature of a single trait. In a
true competition, an individual must recognize that not all handicaps are complete
handicaps – some may actually make certain tasks easier, such as being in a wheelchair
may make one quicker if going down a moderate hill rather than walking. If a better map
of another is created by an individual, then there should be less reliance on oneself for the
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anchoring of estimations of that other’s abilities. Thus, it could be expected that the
individual would recognize the differences between himself/herself and the other and
have to plan accordingly for any future actions with or against the other. In this way, the
individual would be able to keep the positive evaluation of himself/herself. After an
initial interaction with another individual, we should see less of an anchoring effect and
greater differences between estimations of one’s own abilities and that of another, even
when compared to the cooperative interactions.
1.5 Hypotheses
The preceding information leads to the following hypothesis:
In an interaction between two people, one of whom has been artificially
handicapped with weighted gloves, the type of interaction they share will influence the
degree of mental representation of the handicap. Representation of the handicap should
be evident in estimations of the other person’s physical abilities. In actions where having
the handicap would show a negative impact, the non-handicapped individual should
estimate the actions as easier for themselves to complete as compared to the handicapped
individual. In actions where the handicap might actually have a positive impact, the nonhandicapped individual should estimate the actions as harder for themselves to complete
as compared to the handicapped individual However, the degree of this difference should
be significantly greater in situations that require a greater degree of interaction and
motivation to represent the other. For example, in a non-interactive group individuals
would be less motivated to accurately represent the other and thus rely more on an
egocentric basis for the estimates of the other, producing an anchoring effect. Therefore,
with regard to the non-handicapped individual, we would expect to see a competitive
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condition showing significantly larger differences (with the estimates of the handicapped
person’s ability being much lower than one’s self) than a cooperative condition and a
non-interactive condition. A cooperative condition should show a significantly greater
difference than a non-interactive condition. The non-interactive condition should show
the least difference between estimates of one’s abilities and estimates of the handicapped
individual’s abilities. The same trend of should be found for estimations of specific
actions where the handicap may be an advantage, only with the non-handicapped
individual seeing the actions as harder as compared to the handicapped individual. The
same predicted style of results is expected when measuring estimates from individuals
who have been handicapped, only in the opposite direction. In actions where having the
handicap would show a negative impact, the handicapped individual should estimate the
actions as harder for themselves to complete as compared to the non-handicapped
individual; in actions where the handicap might have a positive impact the handicapped
individual should estimate the actions as easier for themselves to complete as compared
to the non-handicapped individual.
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CHAPTER II
METHODS

2.1 Participants
A total of 54 participants (21 males and 33 females) were used in. Ages ranged
from 18 to 58 (mean = 27.4, SD = 8.75). Fourteen participants were undergraduate
students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Cleveland State University who
received credit towards a class requirement for their participation; the remainder of the
participants was volunteers who received no compensation. Volunteers came from
different educational levels (GED to Master’s Degree), different occupations, and
different backgrounds. However, no reliable detailed demographic data was recorded.
Other than age, with the undergraduate students being younger (mean = 19.14, SD =
0.77) as compared to the volunteers (mean = 30.3, SD = 8.42), there were no differences
in the patterns of data recorded from either group. Both groups of participants were
collapsed into a single population.
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Each individual experimental session required two participants. Due to difficulty
in recruiting two naïve participants for a single session confederates were utilized in ten
sessions.
Dyads were both mixes sex (n=16) and same sex (n=16).
As all equipment in this experiment was portable, multiple locations were used in
data collection. Twenty participants were collected at Cleveland State University; all
other participants were collected elsewhere. Locations for the rest of the data collected
included multiple residential dwellings within central and north-eastern Ohio. All
locations contained a table large enough for two individuals to complete the interaction
task face-to-face and all locations were reasonably devoid of external stimuli.
2.2 Design
2.2.1 Independent Variables
Handicapping
In order to test the previously stated hypotheses, it was necessary for one of the
two participants to be handicapped. In this case, handicapping was done artificially
through the use of weighted gloves. Gloves weighed approximately four pounds each,
and were created by duct-taping a two-pound dumbbell onto a two-pound weighted glove
(see Figure 2). The weight allowed for a large enough degree of handicapping without
fully compromising the necessary dexterity to complete the interaction task as described
below. A small pilot test (n=5) showed noticeable impact in performing the interaction
task (i.e. slowing in the time of completion) at this four pound level. Due to the use of
dumbbells, weights above four pounds were found to be too cumbersome and the task
was found to be more difficult due to the space the dumbbells required, not solely weight

24

alone. The necessary space occupied by the heavier weights led to motion control
problems beyond what was warranted for this study.
The use of such a handicap had the side effect of creating two distinct groups of
participants – Handicapped and Non-Handicapped. Thus, Handicapping becomes the first
independent variable in the analysis and a two-tier factor within the experimental design.
Fig 1: Handicapping Gloves

Interaction-Condition Task
Once a handicap had been created, to test the hypothesis an interaction-condition
task is needed to create groups for competition, cooperation, as well as a similar noninteractive control group for the second independent variable and the three factor level of
the experimental design. For this purpose, a cup stacking procedure was used.
Cup stacking in this procedure was defined as the act of a single participant, or
two participants together, placing cups on top of each other in a predefined configuration
using two hands. For this experiment, a specific configuration of three separate structures
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was used. At the end of this configuration two pyramids each made of three cups and one
final pyramid made of six cups were erected; this is called a 3-6-3 stacking configuration
(Figure 2). The configuration described above was used in all three interaction groups.
Figure 2: 3-6-3 Cup Stacking Configuration

The cup stacking procedure was a between-participants manipulation, meaning
that participants competed or participants cooperated or participants did not interact with
each other. Task manipulation was used in the attempt to create three distinct groups of
participants – Competitive participants, Cooperative participants, and Non-Interactive
participants, the latter of which was to serve as a control group. The procedure was
designed to allow for testing of handicap integration in perception of another by type of
interaction shared.
In the non-interactive group, participants were placed at separate ends of a table.
Each was given a set of cups to stack so that they could do the procedure at the same
time. The procedure was explained to the participants as such: using the first of four trials

26

as a baseline time to measure against, participants were told to try to better his or her own
time. It was explained that the other person’s time and ability were not important to this
part of the experiment. Participants were told they would receive feedback as to whether
they did better or worse than their original time after completion. That feedback was
provided at the end of the study.
In the competition group, participants were again placed at opposite ends of a
table and each was given a set of cups to stack so that they could do the procedure at the
same time. However, the procedure was explained to the participants under the guise of it
being a competition. To create the illusion of fairness, the experimenter explained to the
participants that it was not the quickest time that would win the competition, but the
individual with the greatest percentage of improvement from his or her original time.
Using the first of four trials as a baseline, the quickest of an individual’s remaining three
trials would be compared to this baseline to create a percentage of improvement. The
percentage would be compared to the percentage of improvement of the other person as
the form of competition. Such an action, in theory, had the object of “leveling the playing
field” in each participant’s mind so that the handicapped participant was not always set
up to lose; this way, the handicapped participant could have the slowest best time, but
still have the best percentage of improvement. Participants were informed that the actual
percentages would be calculated while the experiment was finished, thus the winner
would be declared at the end. The comparing of percentages rather than actual time was
done to create ambiguity as to who had won throughout the rest of the experiment. It
must be noted that this entire calculation of percentages and the declaration of an actual
winner was just an experimental ruse to convince the participants to compete against each
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other. It was the condition of competition, not the actual winner that was important to this
experiment2 and such was explained to participants during debriefing.
In the cooperation group, participants built the cup configuration as a team of two
people. Participants stood side by side and each was allowed only to use one hand. The
person on the right would only use their right hand while the person standing on the left
would only use their left hand. For this study, such a configuration will be referred to as a
“two-person-as-one model.” Participants were told they were competing against a preset
best time and if they beat that time they would win the competition as a group. However,
participants were not told what this best-time was3, retaining ambiguity as to whether or
not they successfully completed the task. Again, the use of the preset time was an
experimental ruse to convince the participants to cooperate with each other. It was the
condition of cooperation, not whether the participants won, that was important to this
experiment, as was explained to participants during debriefing.
It can be argued that all three iterations of the cup stacking procedure utilized
some degree of competition. In the Non-Interactive Group, participants were competing
against themselves; in the Cooperative Group participants were competing against a
preset time; and there was direct competition between participants in the Competition
group. However, the concern was how the participant viewed their relationship with the
other participant (or confederate as the case may have been), and this constant overall use
of some degree of competition somewhat stabilized conditions across groups.
2

However, if one is interested, the actual equation used to create percentage of
improvement scores was (baseline time – quickest time of the three remaining
trails)/baseline time.
3

The experimenter feigned that he could not remember the time and he had it written
down in the other room or in another notebook, and would retrieve it while the
participants completed the other parts of the experiment .
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Interaction Group becomes the second independent variable in the analysis, and a
three-tier factor within the experimental design.
Task Manipulation Check
While it was believed that the experimental paradigm described above would be
successful in the creation of a Non-Interactive, Cooperative, and a Competitive Group, a
manipulation check was used, consisting of a brief survey of three Likert Scale
statements for each participant to rate on a scale of 1(strongly agree) to 4 (strongly
disagree). The statements are as follows: I felt I had to cooperate with the other person; I
felt I had to compete against the other person; I felt no desire to cooperate with or
compete against the other person. In this way, it is possible for participants to rate how
they viewed the interaction they shared; it was expected that should the interaction
manipulation prove valid, significant differences would be seen between interaction
groups. For example, it was expected that the Cooperation Group would provide a
significantly higher rating (with “higher” meaning more agreement) to the statement I felt
I had to cooperate with the other person than both the Competition Group and the NonInteractive Group. The same was expected with each group with its corresponding
statement. Survey responses would allow for a quick analysis, using a series of One-Way
ANOVAs with interaction groups as the independent variable and responses as dependent
variables, as to whether the groups were effectively created.
While it would be easier to analyze the manipulation’s effectiveness by having the
participant choose only one of the above statements instead of having them do a Likert
rating on all three, such a paradigm would work best if cooperation and competition were
mutually exclusive. As argued in section 1.4.3, it is believed that they are not, and a more
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complex check should create a better picture of any subtleties in the participant’s view of
the experimental task.
With Handicapping and Interaction Groups as independent variables, we create a
2(Handicap Group) X 3 (Interaction Group) experimental design.
2.2.2 Dependent Variables
Effort Inventory
In order to show how one person perceives another’s physical ability, and how it
differentiates from the perception of their own abilities, and thus giving us a reasonable
way of measuring mental integration of the aforementioned handicap, a measure was
created specifically for this study – the Effort Inventory, a Likert-scored survey that was
completed after the Interaction Group Manipulation. For this survey, each participant was
asked to imagine a series of tasks, and then rate how much effort they would likely have
to expend to complete the tasks, as well as how much effort the other participant in the
study session would likely have to expend on the same task. Participants were asked to
rate the individual tasks on a scale of 1 (little to no effort) to 5 (a lot of effort). By
judging ratings for themselves, as well as ratings for the other person, the degree of
integration of the handicap into schemas of the other should show in estimations of effort
needed to complete simple tasks. This inventory consisted of nine simple tasks that were
designed to interact with the handicap in three ways.
First, three tasks were designed to be relatively harder to complete with the
weighted gloves, thus creating a “Harder with Weights” category of answers. This
category consisted of the following tasks: holding your hand above your head, eating
with a spoon, and brushing your teeth. It should be noticed that these items required
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using one’s hands to fight against gravity; as such, once weighted, more energy would be
need to be expended to complete the task. It was expected that, should a NonHandicapped individual be relying less on an egocentric bias in this estimation, they
would rate the Handicapped individual higher in the continuum of effort (i.e., a higher
number, such as 4 or 5), while they rated themselves much lower on the spectrum (i.e., a
lower number, such as 1 or 2). If, however, this Non-Handicapped individual was relying
more on judgments of the one’s own abilities for the other the Handicapped individual
should be seen as more similar to themselves in estimations of effort. If the arguments
made in the first chapter are correct, we would expect to see a significantly larger
difference between the Non-Handicapped individuals’ estimations of his or her own
abilities and the estimations of the Handicapped individual’s estimations in the
Competition Group as compared to the Cooperation Group, as well as significantly larger
differences in the Cooperation Group as compared to the Non-Interactive Group. The
inverse should be true for the Handicapped individuals’ estimations (i.e., a higher rating
for oneself and a lower one for the Non-Handicapped individual when not relying on use
of heuristics).
Three tasks of the Effort Inventory were designed to be relatively easier to
complete with the weighted gloves, thus creating an “Easier with Weights” category of
answers. Bending at the waist and reaching down for your toes, pulling a lever
downwards, and flattening a Styrofoam cup against a table comprised that category. All
three of those items, upon examination, revolved around moving one’s hands towards the
pull of gravity; as such, once weighted, one’s hands would be more inclined to fall and
thus less energy should, in theory, be expended. With those items, it was expected that
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should a Non-Handicapped individual be relying less on heuristic use in this estimation,
they would rate the Handicapped individual lower in the spectrum of effort (i.e., a
number such as 1 or 2), while they rated themselves much higher in the spectrum (i.e., a
number such as 4 or 5). If, however, this Non-Handicapped individual was relying more
on use of heuristics in their estimations of the Handicapped individual, these estimations
should be closer to the estimations of oneself than not (i.e., both should be higher
numbers). If the arguments made in the first chapter are correct, we would expect to see a
significantly larger difference between the Non-Handicapped individuals’ estimations of
his own abilities and the estimations of the Handicapped individuals’ estimations in the
Competition Group as compared to the Cooperation Group, as well as significantly larger
differences in the Cooperation Group as compared to the Non-Interactive Group. The
inverse should be true for the Handicapped individuals’ estimations (i.e., a lower rating
for oneself and a higher one for the Non-Handicapped individual when not relying on use
of heuristics).
Finally, the final category of Effort Inventory tasks was designed to show no
difference in effort expenditure whether an individual was handicapped by the gloves or
not. The three items that comprised this category were: reciting the ABC’s backwards,
stomping your feet while sitting, and counting to 100 by 5s. None of these three tasks
actually involved the use of one’s hands; as such, no difference in energy expended to
complete these tasks should be attributable to the handicap used in this experiment.
Similar numbers would be expected between the individuals, regardless as to whether
they were Handicapped or Non-Handicapped, in all interaction groups. This category was
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added as a check. If there are no outside influences other than the interaction group and
the use of the artificial handicap, similar ratings should be evident.
All nine tasks were chosen by a small pilot test (n=10), during which participants
were given a list of fifteen tasks and asked to think about each task with regard to
whether they would be harder to complete while wearing four-pound weighted gloves,
easier to complete while wearing four-pound weighted gloves, or if the four-pound
weighted gloves would make no difference on how easy or difficult the task would be.
Only tasks that received unanimous agreement across all pilot participants were used in
creating the Effort Inventory. All nine of the tasks were put in random order when
drafting the Effort Inventory.
Participant ratings served multiple purposes in the analyses.
First, self-ratings were used as a manipulation check. Since the experiment
involved use of both individuals who wore the gloves and those that did not, by
examining the scores of effort from the handicapped individual, it was possible to see if
the use of the gloves had an effect on the estimation of how much effort the tasks would
need in the expected way. It was expected that the Harder with Weights category of
items should show significantly higher scores from the Handicapped group while the
Easier with Weights should show significantly higher scores from the Non-Handicapped
group, while there should be no discernable difference between Handicap groups on the
No Difference with Weights category.
Second, by examining the difference between the self-scores and the other-scores,
we can see integration of the handicap, or lack thereof in perception of the other
individual’s abilities, where ability can be assumed by the amount of effort needed to
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complete a task (such that less effort would assume greater ability). Minor data
manipulation was needed. For all participants, a new score was created – a “Difference
between scores on the self and scores from others on the effort inventory” score, or, more
succinctly, a “Difference Score”. This “Difference Score” was created by subtracting the
score for “the other person” from the score for “you”, creating a new score range of -4 to
4. In this new range, negative numbers reflected that the participant felt that the other
person in the study would have had to put more effort into doing the action while positive
numbers indicated that the participant felt that the other person would have had to put in
less effort than himself/herself for the action. A score of zero indicated that the
participant felt the amount of effort would have been the same between himself/herself
and the other person. It is this Difference Score that became the dependent variable in
the overall analysis of the hypothesis. By examining this difference, based on the
interaction group an individual was in (Competition, Cooperation, or Non-Interaction),
we should see significant differences. That is, there should be a significantly larger
difference between estimations of oneself and the other in the Competition Group as
compared to the Cooperation Group. There should also be a significantly larger
difference between estimations of oneself and the other in the Cooperation Group as
compared the Non-Interactive Group.
2.2.3 Demographics
A brief demographic questionnaire was utilized, collecting data such as age,
height, and weight. Data was to be utilized as a method for possible explanations in case
outliers appeared in the data patterns, should such outliers appear.
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2.3 Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the Competition Group, the Cooperation
Group, or the Non-Interactive Group by the experimenter before the experimental
session. The random assignment of condition order was established before data collection
began. Both participants arrived to the study session at the same time. Once both
participants were present, they were asked to read through and sign consent forms. With
consent garnered, one participant was fitted with the weighted gloves, effectively
handicapping their arm movements. The experimental procedure was then explained to
the participants, telling them that there were three parts to the study. It was explained to
participants as such: first participants would need to do the cup stacking procedure; this
procedure would then be followed by some paperwork involving a brief survey,
demographics, and the Effort Inventory. The Effort Inventory outlined tasks that
participants were told would be completed in the third part of the experiment and asked
participants to rate, beforehand, how much effort they thought it would take to complete
these tasks; finally the third part of the experiment was to be the actual completion of the
tasks on the Effort Inventory. It was also explained that the weighted gloves would be
used in the first and third part, emphasizing this fact in front of both participants.
After this explanation, participants were then asked to participate in the control,
competition, or cooperation conditions involving cup stacking. In both cooperation and
competition conditions, participants were told they would not know whether or not they
won the task until the end of the experiment. Once this task was completed, Handicapped
participants were told they could take the gloves off to rest while they filled out the
paperwork, but they were reminded again, in front of the non-handicapped person, that
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they would have to put the gloves back on to complete the tasks of the third section.
Participants were then separated and asked to fill out the demographic questionnaire, the
interaction manipulation check survey, and the effort inventory. Once completed,
participants were brought together and debriefed that there was no actual third part to the
study and they didn’t actually have to do the tasks outlined on the effort inventory.
Participants were then dismissed.
2.4 Data Analysis
2.4.1 Manipulation Checks
Before any hypothesis testing, it was necessary to double check the validity of all
the methods and manipulations used in the experiment. This was especially important as
many of the methods have been untested in previous literature and, while small pilot tests
have shown evidence of validity, these methods have not been tested on a larger scale.
Checking the validity of the task group manipulation (Competition, Cooperation,
and Non-Interactive) was accomplished by use of participant answers on the Task
Manipulation Check Survey. Three One-Way ANOVAs were planned to compare the
scores on each of the questions on the scores on each of the questions on the Task
Manipulation Check Survey on the three different levels of Interaction Group. The
hypothesis for this was that the Task Manipulation Check Survey scores were dependent
on Interaction-Condition Group. It was expected, for example, that the Cooperation
Group would provide a significantly higher rating (with higher meaning more agreement)
to the statement I felt I had to cooperate with the other person than both the Competition
Group and the Non-Interactive Group. The same was expected with each group and its
corresponding statements (I felt I had to compete against the other person and I felt no
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desire to cooperate with or compete against the other person). For this analysis,
Interaction Group would be the independent between-participants variable and contain
three levels (Cooperative Group, Competitive Group, and Non-Interactive Group). The
Likert scale answers to each of the three questions on the Task Manipulation Check
Survey would be the dependent variable for each separate ANOVA.
Checking that the handicap had the desired effect on the items of the Effort
Inventory was also necessary. This was accomplished by use of the Self Scores on the
Effort Inventory. To do this, a series of nine independent samples t tests was planned,
using the hypothesis of the Self Scores on the Effort Inventory for each item as dependent
on the Handicapping Group. What this meant was that whether an individual was fitted
with the handicapping gloves or not would determine their estimates of their own ability
to do the tasks on the Effort Inventory. It was expected that the Harder with Weights
category of items should show significantly higher scores from the Handicapped group
while the Easier with Weights should show significantly higher scores from the NonHandicapped group. The differences seen in the t-tests should highlight individuals in the
Handicapped group were seeing the Easier with Weights items as actually easier, the
Harder with Weights items as harder, and the No difference with Weights items as
actually showing no impact from the handicap. Since these tests involved only one’s
estimations of one’s own abilities, Interaction grouping was not taken into account.
A more in-depth check of the Effort Inventory was planned after this initial check.
A factor analysis was to be used to identify the similarity in the rates of variance between
items in an effort to simplify data analysis. The idea behind the Effort Inventory is that
items on it should be attributable to three different conditions (“No Difference with
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Weights”, “Harder with Weights”, and “Easier with the Weights”), each condition taking
three of the items. So, if all three items are “Harder with weights” and participants are
seeing them as “Harder with weights” then we should see the responses varying in a
similar pattern between those three items. This translates into the factor loading score,
where items with similar variance show higher loadings on individual factors.
2.4.2 Hypothesis Testing
If all the manipulation checks returned with the expected results, the analysis used
to for hypothesis testing design would be the 2 X 3 design mentioned in section 2.2,
utilizing the Handicapping Group and the Interaction Group as independent variables.
Handicapping Group would contain two levels – participants who have been handicapped
and participants who have not been handicapped. Interaction Group would contain three
levels – Cooperative Group, Competitive Group, and Non-Interactive Group. Both
Handicapping Group and Interaction Group would be between-participants. The three
categories of scores on the Effort Inventory (Easier, Harder, No difference with the
weights) would be the dependent variable of the analysis. The MANOVA should reveal
an interaction between the handicap and type of interaction.
Unfortunately, as the analyses show, manipulation checks did not return with the
expected results. Due to the non-significance of the aforementioned manipulation checks,
both the Non-Interactive Group and the Easier with Weights Category of items from the
effort inventory had to be dropped from the analyses. With these subtractions, the
experimental design used for analysis resulted in being a 2 X 2 design. Handicapping
Group and Interaction Group were still used as independent variables. Handicapping
Group still had the same two levels as listed in the previous paragraph. Interaction Group,
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however, was cut down to two levels, analyzing data only upon the Cooperative Group
and the Competitive Group. Both variables were still between-participants variables.
Scores on the Effort Inventory were dependent variables with analysis only focusing on
the two remaining categories – Harder with Weights and No Difference with Weights. A
MANOVA was still utilized for the analysis.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
3.1 Participants
3.1.1 Demographics
When relying on a convenience sample it is often difficult in creating equal
groupings of sex and age across conditions. This was the case with the current
experiment. Table I (below) shows a breakdown in demographics across groups.
Table I: Breakdown of Sex and Age by Interaction Group
Non-Interactive

NonHandicapped

Handicapped

mean

Cooperative

sex

number

male

1

19.00

female

8

29.00 female

sex

number

male

4

25.00

female

5

27.00 female

age

mean
age

Competitive
mean

sex

number

male

3

37.00

6

27.83 female

age

mean

number

male

3

27.67

6

29.17

sex

number

male

3

20.67

6

23.83 female

age

mean

sex

age

mean

sex

number

male

7

30.00

2

21.50

age

3.1.2 Confederates
Due to the difficulty in locating two naïve participants for a single session,
confederates were relied on for multiple trials. While regrettable this is sometimes
unavoidable. In the current experiment, confederates were used a total number of ten
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times. Confederates were situated so that they were used an equal number of times across
handicapping groups. Table II (below) shows a breakdown into which conditions
confederates were utilized.
Table II: Confederate Use
Interaction

Handicapped

Number

Group

Group

Used

handicapped

3

non-handicapped

3

handicapped

1

non-handicapped

1

handicapped

1

non-handicapped

1

Non-Interactive

Cooperative

Competitive

A series of independent samples t-tests, utilizing confederate usage as an
independent variable and all recorded variables of interest as dependant variables,
revealed no differences in the patterns of data between the sessions where confederates
were used and sessions where no confederates were used was recorded. Those
participants who interacted with a confederate were added into the general subject
population.
3.1.3 Dyads
Sixteen mixed sex dyads and sixteen same sex dyads were used. In an effort to
continue random assignment of condition orders, these dyads were not counterbalanced
across groups. Table III (below) shows a breakdown upon how many individuals were
involved in mixed sex dyads across conditions.
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Table III: Mixed-sex Dyad Use
Interaction Group

Non-Interactive

Cooperative

Competitive

Dyad

Number or
Participants

Mixed-Sex

8

Same-Sex

10

Mixed-Sex

9

Same-Sex

9

Mixed-Sex

12

Same-Sex

6

A large scale MANOVA was utilized with all variables of interest as dependant
upon whether the dyad was mixed-sex or not. No main effect for mixed-sex dyad use
witnessed (Pillai’s Trace value of 0.73, F(27,16) = 1.58, p = 0.170). All dyads were
collapsed into a single population.
3.2 Manipulation Checks
Before testing the hypothesis, it the validity of the data acquired was examined.
3.2.1 Interaction-Task Manipulation
In order to check that the Interaction Task truly created separate groups (a
Cooperation Group, a Competition Group, and a Non-Interactive Group), three one-way
ANOVAs were used with the participant responses to the three category statements from
the Task Manipulation Check Survey (i.e. I felt I had to cooperate with the other person,
I felt I had to compete against the other person, and I did not feel as if I had to cooperate
with the other person or compete against the other person) as dependent upon the
interaction group (Non-interactive, Cooperative, Competitive) the participant was in. For
clarity’s sake, scores were reversed so that higher scores showed higher agreement with
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the statement. Breakdown of the individual question results are shown in Table IV
(below).
Table IV: Interaction Condition Statements Check ANOVA
Partial Eta
F

p
Squared

Cooperative Condition

F(2,51) =

Statement

17.35

Competitive Condition

F(2,51) =

Statement

21.46

0.00

0.50

0.00

0.64

0.163

0.07

Non-Interactive
F(2,51) = 1.41
Condition Statement

Bonferroni Post-Hoc tests show the Cooperative Interaction Group to have
answered significantly different from the Competitive Interaction Group and the NonInteraction Group on the level they agreed with the statements “I felt I had to cooperate
with the other person” and “I felt I had to compete against the other person” (p < 0.01 on
both statements) but not on the statement “I did not feel as if I had to cooperate with the
other person or compete against the other person” (p = 1.00 compared to Competition
and p = 0.179 compared to the Non-Interaction Group). The Competitive Interaction
Group did not differ significantly from the Non-Interaction Group on any statements (p >
0.10 on all statements). See Table V (page 41) for the means and standard deviations for
all groups on all statements.
The significance differences between the Competitive Group and the Cooperative
Group on their respected task questions indicate that the manipulations that defined both
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the Cooperative and the Competitive Groups were successful. However, the NonInteractive manipulation does not appear to have been successfully implemented in the
experiment. Possible reasons for this will be discussed in the Discussion Section.
Since the Non-Interactive Group failed to materialize in the expected way, any
analysis featuring that group cannot be interpreted in a way to either support or refute the
hypothesis. As such, this group must be dropped from hypothesis testing.
Table V: Means and Standard Deviations for task manipulation check
Task Manipulation Check
Non-Interactive Category
Statement

Mean

Standard Deviation

Non-Interactive Group

2.28

0.96

Cooperative Group

1.72

0.96

Competitive Group

1.94

0.64

Statement

Mean

Standard Deviation

Non-Interactive Group

2.11

1.02

Cooperative Group

3.72

0.46

Competitive Group

1.94

0.87

Statement

Mean

Standard Deviation

Non-Interactive Group

3.11

0.90

Cooperative Group

1.44

0.51

Competitive Group

3.5

0.62

Cooperative Category

Competitive Category

3.2.2 Handicap Manipulation Check
In order to judge that the use of weighted gloves had the intended effect of
making some physical tasks more difficult and some easier, a series of independent
sample t tests was run on the Self-Score for the Effort Inventory. These responses became
the dependent variable of this series of analyses. For this series of analyses, participants
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were separated into two groups – Handicapped (i.e., those participants who wore the
gloves) and Non-Handicapped (i.e., those participants who did not wear the weighted
gloves). While averaging scores across the categories of items (i.e. “No Difference with
Weights”, “Harder with Weights”, “Easier with Weights”) may lessen the amount of data
worked with for this analysis, it was felt that since the Effort Inventory is an untested
instrument, each item needed to be examined individually. Tables VI and VII list the
pertinent results.

Table VI: Means and Standard Deviations for items on the Effort Inventory
Non-Handicapped Group

Handicapped Group

Standard

"No Difference with Weights"

Mean

Standard
Mean

Deviation

Deviation

Stomping your feet while sitting

1.52

0.89

1.41

0.69

Counting to 100 by 5s

1.89

1.25

1.41

0.89

Reciting the ABC's backwards

4.52

1.05

3.96

1.37

"Harder with Weights"

Mean

Standard

Standard
Mean

Deviation

Deviation

Holding your hands over your head

1.33

0.55

2.19

1.24

Eating with a spoon

1.33

0.73

2.04

1.32

Brushing your teeth

1.52

0.98

2.04

1.09

"Easier with Weights"

Mean

Standard

Standard
Mean

Deviation

Deviation

Bending at the waist and reaching
2.22

1.16

2.33

1.39

1.41

0.75

1.63

0.97

1.89

0.98

1.56

0.85

down for your toes
Pulling a lever downwards
Flattening a Styrofoam cup against a
table
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Table VII: t-values and significance levels for Handicap check on the Effort Inventory
"No Difference with Weights"

t

p

Stomping your feet while sitting

t(52) = 0.51

0.612

Counting to 100 by 5s

t(49.91) = 1.63*

0.11

Reciting the ABC's backwards

t(48.70) = 1.67*

0.101

"Harder with Weights"

t

Significance
Level
Holding your hands over your head

t(35.98) = -3.26*

0.002

Eating with a spoon

t(40.76) = -2.43*

0.02

Brushing your teeth

t(52) = -1.84

0.071

"Easier with Weights"

T

Significance
Level
Bending at the waist and reaching
t(52) = -0.32

0.75

t(52) = -0.95

0.349

t(52) = 1.34

0.186

down for your toes
Pulling a lever downwards
Flattening a Styrofoam cup against a
table
*Corrections in df have been used where violations in Equality of Variances existed.

In the No Difference with Weights category of items, no significant differences
were found between the Handicapped and Non-Handicapped participants for all three
items. This was expected.
In the Harder with Weights category of items, two of the three items showed
significant differences: “Holding your hands over your head” (t(35.98) = -3.25, p =
0.002) and “Eating with a Spoon” (t(40.76) = -2.42, p = 0.020). The third item, “Brushing
your teeth”, showed a p value that neared but did not cross the threshold for significance
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(t(52) = -1.84, p = 0.07). While only two of the three items showed actual significance,
means reveal that participants in the Handicapped Group viewed all three items as more
difficult (see Table VI above for actual means).
Contrary to expectations, the items labeled as “Easier with the Weights” showed
no significant differences between the two groups for any of the three items. Refer to
Table VI for actual means and standard deviations for both groups on all items; also see
Table VII for all t values and p levels.
What those results show is that Handicapped participants did see themselves as
having to expend more effort on the “Harder with Weights” items than the NonHandicapped participants; however, the Handicapped participants did not see themselves
as having to expend more effort on the “Harder with Weights” items as compared with
the “No Difference with Weights” items. Both results were expected. The “Easier with
Weights” category of tasks, however, showed no significant differences between groups,
which was not expected based on pilot testing of the Effort Inventory. The lack of
significant differences hints at problems either with the handicapping or with the Effort
Inventory itself. If the participants that were handicapped did not see the “Easier with
Weights” items as being less effortful than non-handicapped participants, any analysis
based on this category of tasks becomes incredibly hard to interpret, if not impossible.
Before making such judgments, however, a factor analysis was conducted.
3.2.3 Effort Inventory Check
In light of the above issue apparent with the “Easier with Weights” category, a
Principle Components Factor Analysis was run on the newly created variable of
“Difference Score” (see Chapter 3.2.4 to see how this score was created) in order to
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check if the validity of the Effort Inventory. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of
sampling adequacy was .0.66. Significance was seen in Bartlett’s test of sphericity
(2(36) = 261.37, p= .00). Initial eigen values showed a three-factor solution for
explaining a cumulative total for 74% of the variance. A four factor solution only
explained an additional 10% of variance. Since the three factor solution was in line with
the theory of three separate grouping of items in the Effort Inventory, this was chosen as
the final solution. A Varimax rotation was utilized in this analysis in order to make
interpretation as easy as possible.
Should the Effort Inventory be valid, each of the different grouping of items (“No
Difference with Weights”, “Harder with Weights”, and “Easier with the Weights”) would
load highly into three separate factors, with each of the grouping factor’s individual items
showing similar variance with the other items in the grouping. This is not what happened.
The “Harder with Weights” items loaded highly into a single factor (rotated
loadings of 0.91 for “Holding your hands over your head”, 0.95 for “Eating with a
spoon”, and 0.95 for “Brushing your teeth”) as expected, with no cross-loading. Also,
two of the “No Difference with Weights” items (“Stomping your feet while sitting” and
(Counting to 100 by 5s”) created a single factor by themselves with no real cross
loadings, which also bodes well for the idea behind this category and, at least, these two
items’ representation of the category.
Unfortunately, it is the “Easier with Weights” category where problems are
readily apparent. While “Bending at the waist and reaching down for your toes” and
“Pulling a lever downwards” both load onto the same factor, their loadings are much
lower (0.59 and 0.67 respectively) than the previously mentioned items on their
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respective factors. This may not be a problem in and of itself; however the fact that those
items load onto the same factor as “Reciting the ABC’s backwards”, which has a much
higher loading (0.809), is a problem. These loadings lead one to suspect that there is an
unforeseen confound behind the variance of these items, a variable besides these items
being supposedly “Easier with Weights”. Evidence of such a mystery variable is further
seen in the fact that “Flattening a Styrofoam cup against a table” loaded similarly on all
of the rotated factors (-0.50 for the first factor, 0.48 for the second factor, and 0.41 for the
third factor).
All together, putting the items into three factors accounted for 73.996% of the
variance observed. See Table VIII for factor loadings and percent of variance each
individual factor accounted for.
These results show problems with the theory behind the creation and selection of
items for the Effort Inventory, notably within the category of “Easier with Weights”.
With the uncertainty in what may be influencing these results, it becomes necessary, for
the sake of clarity of what results can be gathered, to drop all problem items (“Reciting
the ABC’s backwards”, “Bending at the waist and reaching down for your toes”, “Pulling
a lever downwards”, and “Flattening a Styrofoam cup against a table”) from hypothesis
testing.
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Table VIII: PCA Factor Loadings and Percentage of Variance*
The larger factor loadings are shaded for each factor.
Effort Inventory Item

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Stomping your feet while sitting

0.06

0.95

0.06

Counting to 100 by 5s

0.04

0.89

0.05

Reciting the ABC's backwards

-0.06

0.04

0.80

Holding your hands over your head

0.91

0.13

0.15

Eating with a spoon

0.95

-0.03

0.17

Brushing your teeth

0.95

0.00

-0.03

Bending at the waist and reaching down for your toes

0.03

0.309

0.59

Pulling a lever downwards

0.30

-0.10

0.67

Flattening a Styrofoam cup against a table

-0.50

0.49

0.40

Percentage of variance

33.05

22.59

18.35

* Numbers listed are values after Varimax Rotation.

3.3 Hypothesis Testing
With the Factor Analysis failing to support the basic premise of the Effort
Inventory for all variations of how the added weight would interact with the groupings of
items, and with the apparent problems in creating a Non-Interaction Group, it becomes
clear that the proposed hypothesis cannot be adequately tested with the current set of
data. Those issues in the data would make any conclusions regarding the Non-Interactive
Group and/or a full understanding of how the handicap would lessen effort on various
actions highly suspect. While these issues of failure are important and may shed light on
other, underlying processes (which will be examined in the Discussion Section), they
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unfortunately come at the cost of the hypothesis as a whole. Utilizing only those
manipulations that showed relative success, analyses must be made on only two
categories of interaction, Cooperation and Competition, and with only two categories of
items, “Harder with Weights” and “No Difference with Weights”.
3.3.1. Data Reduction.
Rather than running a MANOVA on every individual item on the effort
inventory, it seemed more prudent to sum those items that came out as expected in the
previous factor analysis into their overall categories. Two composite scores were created,
one score for those three items that would be “Harder with Weights” (“Holding your
hands over your head”, “Eating with a spoon”, and “Brushing your teeth”) and one score
for those two items that came out as expected in the “No Difference with Weights”
(“Stomping your feet while sitting” and “Counting to 100 by 5s”).
3.3.2 Analysis
The previous manipulation check already showed a significant difference on the
“Harder with Weights” items, between those individuals who were handicapped and
those who were not. A MANOVA was run on the composite scores “Harder with
Weights” and the “No Difference with Weights” items respectively as dependent
variables. Interaction Group membership (Competitive vs. Cooperative) and
Handicapping Group (Handicapped vs. Non-Handicapped) became the independent
variables. This allows for any interaction between the independent variables to be
observed.
The MANOVA test revealed no significant interaction between Handicapping and
Interaction Groups, with a Pillai’s Trace a value of 0.12 and an F(2,31) of 2.06, p=0.144,
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and a partial eta squared of 0.12. Analysis revealed no significant results for Interaction
Condition with a Pillai’s Trace a value of 0.11 and an F(2,31) of 1.93, p=0.162, and a
partial eta squared of 0.11. Analysis did reveal a significant result for Handicapping, with
Pillai’s Trace revealing a value of 0.38 and an F(2,31) of 9.61, p=0.001, and a partial eta
squared of 0.38; those who were handicapped showed a larger degree of difference
between estimations of themselves and the other on the “Harder with Weights” category
of items, with the handicapped individuals seeing the grouping of items as harder for
themselves, as compared to the non-handicapped individuals. Individual ANOVA values
are listed below in Tables IX and X for each category if Items (“Harder with Weights”
and “No Difference with Weights”). See Tables X and XI for individual means and
standard deviations for each of the Handicapping Groups (Handicapped and NonHandicapped). Figures 3 and 4 plot the means.
It is of interest, however, that in the “Harder with Weights” Category summation,
a near significant interaction existed between Handicapping and Interaction Condition
(Table IX, above). The effect size lies within the moderate range; it is possible a larger
sample size may reveal a truly significant interaction.
The analysis results do not support the hypothesis. The Interaction Condition does
not appear to significantly affect the scores on the Effort Inventory. However,
Handicapping does appear to have a significant effect on the Effort Inventory, with
Handicapped individuals seeing the Harder with Weights items as necessitating a higher
expenditure of effort on their, the Handicapped individual’s, part.
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Table IX: Harder with Weights MANOVA results
"Harder with Weights"

F

P

Handicapping x Condition

F(1,32)= 3.84

0.059

Partial
Eta
Squared
0.11

Interaction Condition

F(1,32)= 2.57

0.119

0.07

Handicapping

F(1,32) = 19.84

0.000

0.38

Table X: No Difference with Weights MANOVA results
"No Difference with Weights"

F

P

Handicapping x Condition

F(1,32)= 0.20

0.658

Partial
Eta
Squared
0.01

Interaction Condition

F(1,32)= 1.80

0.189

0.05

Handicapping

F(1,32) = 0.20

0.658

0.01

Table XI: Means and Standard Deviations of the Handicapped Group for the Cooperative
and the Competitive Group.
Cooperative Group

Competitive Group

Category
"No Difference with Weights"

Mean
0.22

Standard
Deviation
0.44

Mean
0

Standard
Deviation
0.50

"Harder with Weights"

1.67

2.69

2

3.04

Table XII: Means and Standard Deviations of the Non-Handicapped Group for the
Cooperative and the Competitive Group.

Category
"No Difference with Weights"
"Harder with Weights"

Cooperative Group
Standard
Mean
Deviation
0.11
0.33

Competitive Group
Standard
Mean
Deviation
0.00
0.00

-0.67

-4.00
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1.41

3.61

3.3.3 Data Trends
While the statistical analyses do not support the hypothesis, trends shown in the
graphs provide marginal support the hypothesis. While graphical data should be taken
with a grain of salt, especially in a sample as small as this one, the current data does show
non-significant support for the hypothesis. Figures 3 and 4 represent graphical
interpretation of the means.
In the Handicapped Group (see Figure 2), the competitive group does see a larger
degree of difference between themselves and the other person than compared to the
cooperative group on the “Harder with Weights” score, even if it is not anywhere near the
level seen in the Non-Handicapped Group. This is in line with the hypothesis. In the “No
Difference with Weights” category score, for both the Handicapped and NonHandicapped Groups (see Figure 2 and Figure 3), the Cooperative Group did see a larger
difference between themselves and the other person than in the Competitive Group.
While this was not specifically predicted, it is also in line with the hypothesis, where an
individual would be more aware of the degrees to which a handicap would affect a
person; in this category there should be no effect.
However, as previously mentioned, these are non-significant results, and while
increasing the sample size would increase the chances that such small differences would
be found to be significant, as it stands at the moment this is only conjecture. In fact, with
the estimated effect sizes for Interaction Condition lying in the low to moderate range, it
is doubtful that true significance would be found. With these results, it is reasonable to
assume that explanations other than the proposed hypotheses could account for the
results. This will be discussed in the Discussion Section. .
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Figure 3:
Handicapped Group Means
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Figure 4:
Non-Handicapped Group Means
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-1.000
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55

3.4 Additional Findings
3.4.1 Sex Differences
One ancillary finding of note in this experiment has been differences between
sexes on answers to the Task Manipulation Check Survey Questions. Sex differences
exist in the rate of reported Competition across two of the three Interaction Condition
groups. A two-way MANOVA, with answers to the Task Manipulation Check Survey
Questions as dependent on both Sex and Interaction Condition, found no interaction
between Sex and Interaction Condition (Pillai’s Trace: F(6,92) = 1.68, p = 0.135, , partial
eta squared = 0.10), but did find main effects for both Interaction Condition (Pillai’s
Trace: F(6,92) = 18.43, p = 0.00, partial eta squared = 0.40) and for Sex (Pillai’s Trace:
F(3,46) = 4.57, p = 0.007,partial eta squared = 0.23). Since Interaction Condition has
already been discussed at length above (see section 4.2.1 for those results), there is no
need to reiterate the facts here. Individual ANOVA results for each Task Manipulation
Check Survey Question are listed below in Table XIII. Table XIV represents means and
standard deviations. Figure 5 provides plots the group means.
Table XIII: Interaction Condition Statements Check ANOVA for Sex Differences
Task Manipulation
Check Survey Question
Cooperation Condition
Statement
Competition Condition
Statement
Non-Interactive
Condition Statement

Partial Eta

F

p

F(2,48)=4.95

0.031

0.09

F(2,48)=7.03

0.011

0.13

F(2,48)=1.08

0.324

0.02
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Squared

Table XIV: Means, by Interaction Groups, for males and females to the Task
Manipulation Check Survey Questions
Question
Cooperate

Compete Neither

male

2.00

3.80

2.00

female

2.15

2.85

2.38

male

3.67

1.67

1.67

female

3.75

1.33

1.75

male

1.40

3.60

1.80

female

2.63

3.38

2.13

Condition

Control

Cooperation

Competition

Figure 5
Sex Differences for the Task Manipulation
Questions
3.5

Mean Score

3
2.5
2

male
female

1.5
1
0.5
0
Cooperate

Compete

Neither

Task Manipulation Question

The data in Figure 5 shows that males were significantly more likely to answer
that they felt a stronger desire to compete against the other person than females, as well a
weaker desire to cooperate with the other person when compared to females.
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3.4.2. Age Differences
Another ancillary finding relates to age differences. Due to the large range of ages
of participants (18 to 58 years of age), it was brought to the attention of the experimenter
that differences in responses on both the Task Manipulation Survey and the Effort
Inventory may have been a function of age rather than perception or Interaction
Condition. Analyses reveal that, with one exception, this is not the case.
A large scale MANOVA was run with the following variables as dependent upon
age: all three Task Manipulation Check Questions, the “Harder with Weights” and
“Easier with Weights” summation scores (those used in hypothesis testing above), and
difference scores on all nine items of the Effort Inventory. To control for handicapping,
absolute values were used. In order to clean and ease interpretation of the data, the
experimenter tallied the number of participants falling into five age categories, where
each category spanned a decade. The breakdown of participants by category is listed
below in Table XV.
Table XV: Number of Participants in Age Group
Age Range

Number

19 years old
or younger

11

20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59

25
13
3
2

MANOVA revealed no overall significance. (Pillai’s Trace = 1.03, F (48,164) =
1.19, p = 0.214). However individual 1-Way ANOVA results revealed significance on
one item in the Effort Inventory: “Reciting the ABC’s Backwards” (F (4,49) =3.71, p =
0.10, partial eta squared = 0.23). Bonferroni Post Hoc tests reveals that those individuals
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aged 50-59 showed higher absolute value differences than all other age groups. Given
that “Reciting the ABC’s Backwards” should, in theory, not interact with the handicap,
the means for actual differences were examined as well as the absolute differences. See
Table XVI for the means.
While these data is interesting, and while the effect size for the resulting
difference in “Reciting the ABC’s Backwards” is fairly high, we should be reminded of
the non-significance of the overall MANOVA, and, more so, the large difference in the
sizes of the populations. As there were only two participants aged 50 or over, even in a
population of only 54 individuals, it can hardly be labeled representative to people aged
50 to 59 as a whole. In a larger sample size, those differences may disappear entirely. It
should also be noted that both individuals over the age of 50 were paired with individuals
much younger (ages 33 and 29 respectively). When faced with different age groups, it is
difficult to speculate what, if any, differences would manifest based on only two data
points.
Table XVI: Mean and Standard Deviations for Difference Scores for “Reciting the
ABC’s Backwards”

Age Range

Mean
Difference
Scores*

Mean
Difference
Scores
Standard
Deviations

Mean Absolute
Value
Difference
Scores

Mean Absolute
Value Difference
Scores Standard
Deviations

19 years old
or younger

-0.18

0.41

0.18

0.41

20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59

0.32
0.38
0.00
2.00

0.85
1.19
0.00
1.41

0.56
0.85
0.00
2.00

0.71
0.90
0.00
1.41

*Positive values correspond to the participant believing that the other person
in the study would need to expend less effort to complete the task; negative
values correspond to believing that the other person in the study would need
to expend more effort to complete the task
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION

4.1 Interpretation of Results
4.1.1 Evaluation of Hypotheses
The preceding experiment was used to test the following hypotheses: In an
interaction between two people, one of whom has been artificially handicapped with
weighted gloves, the type of interaction they share will influence the degree of mental
representation of the handicap. Representation of the handicap should be evident in
estimations of the other person’s physical abilities. In actions where having the handicap
would show a negative impact, the non-handicapped individual should estimate the
actions as easier for themselves to complete as compared to the handicapped individual.
In actions where the handicap might actually have a positive impact, the nonhandicapped individual should estimate the actions as harder for themselves to complete
as compared to the handicapped individual However, the degree of this difference should
be significantly greater in situations that require a greater degree of interaction and
motivation to represent the other. For example, in a non-interactive group individuals
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would be less motivated to accurately represent the other and thus rely more on an
egocentric basis for the estimates of the other, producing an anchoring effect. Therefore,
with regard to the non-handicapped individual, we would expect to see a competitive
condition showing significantly larger differences (with the estimates of the handicapped
person’s ability being much lower than one’s self) than a cooperative condition and a
non-interactive condition. A cooperative condition should show a significantly greater
difference than a non-interactive condition. The non-interactive condition should show
the least difference between estimates of one’s abilities and estimates of the handicapped
individual’s abilities. The same trend of should be found for estimations of specific
actions where the handicap may be an advantage, only with the non-handicapped
individual seeing the actions as harder as compared to the handicapped individual. The
same predicted style of results is expected when measuring estimates from individuals
who have been handicapped, only in the opposite direction. In actions where having the
handicap would show a negative impact, the handicapped individual should estimate the
actions as harder for themselves to complete as compared to the non-handicapped
individual; in actions where the handicap might have a positive impact the handicapped
individual should estimate the actions as easier for themselves to complete as compared
to the non-handicapped individual.
The hypotheses were marginally supported by the data. Data trends did show
differences in the scores between the Cooperative Group and the Competitive Group in
the Handicapped Group for the “Harder with Weights” category and in both the
Handicapped and Non-Handicapped Group for the “No Difference with Weights”
category, and these differences were in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. The
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analysis did not support the hypothesis. The Interaction Condition did not appear to
significantly affect the scores on the Effort Inventory. Handicapping, as was expected,
did show significant differences between handicapping groups on the “Harder with
Weights” category of items, with handicapped individuals seeing the item in that
category as harder for themselves, as compared to the non-handicapped individuals.
Unfortunately, without a reliable category of items that are “Easier with Weights”
to judge from, nor a valid “Non-Interactive Group” to add into analysis, there are no firm
conclusions that can be made about the hypotheses. There are multiple possible
methodological explanations as to why we obtained the current set of results. Before
these methodological explanations, however, there are other results that need to be
recognized
4.1.2 Evaluation of Interaction of Handicap and Interaction Group
There was a near significant interaction between Handicapping and Interaction
Group on the “Harder with Weights” category (p = .059, partial eta squared at 0.107),
with the non-handicapped participants seeing a much larger degree of difference between
themselves and the handicapped individual in the “Harder with Weights” category of
items. With the moderate effect size, it is possible that, with an increased sample size, the
interaction may have reached significance.
This interaction may be a result of social comparison and the natural tendency of
an individual to see want to see oneself or the group one belongs to as better than a
competitor (see Turner, 1975 for a full review). If, as the current hypothesis suggested,
individuals paid more attention to the other individual in the competitive arrangement,
and thus would have a better understanding as to how a handicap would affect other
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actions, we should have seen equal significance in both the Handicapped and NonHandicapped group, which were not witnessed. Within the Handicapped group mean
scores were only within a 0.5 unit difference, as compared to the nearly 3.5 unit
difference in the Non-Handicapped group (see means in Tables 11 and 12). The ratios are
far from equal. In this case it is possible that the reality of the artificial handicap was
augmented by a desire to see oneself better than the other person. In the NonHandicapped Group, the desire to see oneself as better may have resulted in these
participants making greater higher estimations of their own abilities or greater lowered
expectations of the individual within the handicapped group. Within the Handicapped
Group, this desire to see oneself as better may have counteracted the reality of the
handicap, making participants feel that the degree the handicap would affect their actions
was smaller than it was. Even though the handicapped individuals would have to supply
more effort in those “Harder with Weights” actions than the non-handicapped
individuals, their hypothetical innate superiority would lessen the degree of effort
increase. This seems like a plausible explanation for the current data.
4.1.3 Evaluation of Sex Differences
Analysis showed differences between males and females in their responses to
whether they felt they had to cooperate or compete with the other individual within their
dyad. Data show that males were significantly more likely to answer that they felt a
stronger desire to compete against the other person than females, as well a weaker desire
to cooperate with the other person when compared to females.
Other studies have shown higher degrees of competitive behavior in males as
compared to females starting as early as kindergarten age (Weinberger & Stein, 2008).
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Given the age range of the current population, it suggests that this trend continues well
into middle adulthood. However, given that this was a self-report and even though no
interaction was found between Sex and Interaction Condition, the sample size and
research design was not created specifically for generating data to support that
suggestion. As such it remains only a suggestion and an avenue of future research.
4.1.4 Evaluation of Age Differences
Analysis further showed age differences in the difference scores between
individuals in the dyad on the single item “Reciting the ABC’s backwards” on the effort
inventory. Individuals of fifty years of age or over saw the item as significantly more
difficult for themselves as compared to the other individual within the dyad when
compared to other age groups While there may be multiple explanations for why the
results show what they do, due to the small sample size of individuals fifty or over (n=2),
and no other cognitive variables recorded, such explanations would only be speculation
without theory.
4.2 Methodological issues
As stated earlier, it is possible that methodological confounds could have resulted
in the lack of significant support for the hypotheses. While it is not certain that the
hypotheses would have been supported had there been no issues with the methodology of
the study, the fact that these confounds exist may have had an impact on the results.
4.2.1 Interaction Condition
Non-Interaction Group
One of the most obvious issues in the study revolved around the creation of a
Non-Interactive Group. The results from the Brief Survey showed that while participants
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in the Non-Interactive Group significantly differed from participants in the Cooperative
Group when rating both the “I felt I had to cooperate with the other person” and “I felt I
had to compete against the other person” statements, these Non-Interactive Group
participants did not differ significantly in their responses from the Competitive Group
participants. No significant differences were shown between all groups of participants in
their rating of the statement “I did not feel as if I had to cooperate with the other person
or compete against the other person”. Simply put, while both the Cooperative Group and
the Competitive Group achieved the expected results, the Non-Interactive Group came
closer to the Competitive Group on ratings of all statements. The question must be asked
as to why this was.
The most probable explanation is that the situation was not properly explained to
the participants. While an examination of the means show differences between the
Competitive Group and the Non-Interactive Group in the hypothesized direction on their
Task Manipulation Check, these differences are small enough to just be a byproduct of
noise. With these results, the current experimental procedure for creating a two-person
non-interactive situation should be reexamined. Even though participants in this noninteractive condition were told that they were not interacting during the task, (i.e. that
they were not trying to beat or tie or encourage the other participant), perhaps the
situation could have been highlighted more during the initial briefing. Written
instructions may have been utilized to augment the oral ones. After all, Heffer et al.
(1997) found that more appointments and time spent with a pediatrician were related to
greater recall of instructions, suggesting that more exposure relates to better retention. At
the least, perhaps more oral exposure would have been better suited to the task. On the
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other hand, more exposure has the drawback of possibly creating a forced dynamic. In an
ideal situation, an equal amount of time should be spent to set up each of the interactive
conditions, and if we were to take the extra time to explain the non-interactive rules to the
participants, then we must recognize that between-group imbalance in attention.
It may also be noted that by attempting to make the physical activity in this study
into something that is both challenging and enjoyable for the participants, participants
may have inadvertently primed for competition. While unintentional, it is more than
possible that the participant saw the task as a kind of game. Under this belief, competitive
priming would have been an understandable, if regrettable, side effect.
While the above explanations of methodological issues are the most salient ones,
there is one more explanation that should be examined, the nature of social representation
itself. Those individuals in the non-interactive condition were much more likely to see
their cup stacking task as more competitive in nature than they were to see it as either
neutral or cooperative in nature. It could be that by having both participants in the same
room at the same time and by adding the weighted gloves, two separate groups were
automatically created. Recall the natural tendency of an individual to see want to see
oneself, or the group one belongs to, as better than a competitor (again, see Turner, 1975
for a full review). If one wants to be better, then it is possible one might naturally feel the
need to prove oneself as better, and thus compete. There is some anecdotal evidence. The
experimenter, once the procedure was completed and all data recorded, asked a small
sample of participants why they answered the way they did on the Brief Survey. The
most telling answer, given by a male participant was, “I want to be better than him,”
(Participant 501H, personal interview, September 18th, 2010). As this response occurred
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during what was supposed to be a non-interactive condition, it shows a mindset of
competition. With regard to the goals of the current experiment, such a mindset is
troubling.
Perhaps, if the procedure is used again, it might be more suitable to ask
participants for a small essay regarding how they viewed the other person in the study.
While the use of a survey is quick and painless in both the collection and analysis of the
data, basing results solely upon survey data lacks the depth that could be mined from a
qualitative essay. Future research should consider such use. At the very least, future
research should be aware of the possible issue and create a more detailed survey to better
pick apart the underlying motivations.
Cooperation
While efforts were made to create all conditions of the interaction task as equal as
possible, there remains an issue of coordination differences across the three groups of
Competition, Cooperation, and Non-Interaction. Specifically, in the Cooperation group,
by each individual using only one hand (left or right), individuals had to work as one
physical being instead of working together as a team. It is likely that coordination
demands were higher on individuals than was intended. However, without a measure of
coordination in the study design, there is no way to quantify the degree to which the
increased coordination demands affected the results. Also, by using the two-person-asone-model (see section 3.2.1 – Interaction Condition Task for a description), different
hands were used by different participants. Whether the participant used his or her right or
left hand was not recorded in the data; such information could have been useful in
lessening the ambiguity of the results.
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By using the two-person-as-one-model in the Cooperative condition and using
each individual acting alone in both the Competitive and Non-Interactive conditions, the
interactive paradigm was effectively changed for the Cooperative Group. While the data
shows that the Cooperative Group did feel more of a need to cooperate than the other two
groups under the current interaction model, it is possible that the cost of creating the
feeling of cooperating resulted in variable data that may be difficult to accurately
interpret.
If the current study were ever to be reexamined, a different method of creating a
cooperative group should be implemented. To make conditions more stable across group,
forgoing the two-person-as-one-model for cooperation and replacing it with a both
members of the dyad working together to build the 3-6-3 cup structure with both hands is
recommended. Such a method should decrease the variability across conditions and also
allow for equal use of both hands by both participants. Also, it is recommended that some
measure of coordination demands be used in the study to act as a possible mediating
factor.
Difficulty of task
By accident, participants would knock over their stack of cups during the
interaction task. When accidents such as this happened, timing did not stop and
participants were forced to restart and complete the task while time continued to elapse.
Such accidents happened across all three conditions; however, there was no formal
measurement of the number of accidents that occurred. The fact remains that, at times,
the task appeared more difficult to some participants than to others. It is possible that the
participant’s view of the task may have had some effect on the results as well. Difficulty
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may have related to task satisfaction. While the above is merely speculation, it should be
investigated.
If the current study were to be reexamined, a measure of participant’s difficulty in
completing the task should be included. A self-reported measure can be useful in such
cases, but a more objective measure might be warranted. In that case, it is recommended
that the times of completion be recorded to account for potential confounds in the main
results. In the current study, times were not recorded beyond the need of each individual
experimental session. If records had been kept, it may have been found that shorter or
longer times mediated the degree of difference a participant saw between his or her own
abilities and the abilities of the other.
4.2.2 Effort Inventory
The Effort Inventory is an untested instrument created for the study. In retrospect,
it was naïve to expect that, based on the results of a small pilot study, the data from a
decent number of participants could neatly be distilled down to three categories equally
representative of an effort action (i.e. “Easier with Weights”, “Harder with Weights” and
“No Difference with Weights”). The Factor Analysis illustrates the problems with the
Effort Inventory well.
As seen by the factor loadings, the “Harder with Weights” items (“Holding your
hands over your head”, “Eating with a spoon” and “Brushing your teeth”) load high onto
a single factor with only relatively low loadings on that same factor by other items of the
Inventory. As the items show similar variance across participants, these tasks have the
potential of being kept as they are if the Effort Inventory is to be rewritten.
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The “No Difference with Weights” category shows decent results with regard to
what it was intended to measure. Both “Stomping your feet while sitting” and “Counting
to 100s by 5s” resulted in relatively large loadings on a single factor with no crossloadings and no other item of the Inventory near their levels on that same factor.
“Reciting the ABC’s” backwards, however, does not load onto this factor. The lack of
loading with its hypothesized counterparts will be discussed shortly.
The concept of the “Easier with Weights” category shows significant problems. If
the Effort Inventory is to be kept for future use this category needs rewritten entirely. One
major problem was that the item “Flattening a Styrofoam cup against a table” loaded
similarly across all three categories in the Factor Analysis. Based on the relatively low
loadings (within the 0.40 to 0.50 range, refer to Table IV) and the near equal cross
loading, it appears that participants did not know what to make of this item. While during
the pilot test this item was unanimously labeled as “Easier with Weights”, it should be
noted that instructions for the pilot test were to label the items as “Easier, Harder, or No
Different” with weighted gloves. Those instructions may have primed the pilot
participants to think about the items in a certain way, which may have made more obtuse
actions easier to imagine. It is possible that this item may have been overly complicated
to imagine, which is contrary to the idea behind the Effort Inventory. The same might be
true of the item “Pulling a lever downwards”, despite it’s moderate loading on the third
factor (0.67, again refer to Table VI). While it is not impossible, it is unlikely that many
of the participants encounter levers on a day to day basis.
Instead of the third proposed factor of the Factor Analysis loading the three
“Easier with Weights” items, what we see loading are the following items “Reciting the
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ABC’s backwards”, “Bending at the waist and reaching down for your toes”, and
“Pulling a lever downwards”. Those items may all be linked, not by whether or not an
individual is wearing weights, but by the actual individual him or herself. “Bending at the
waist,” for example, may be rated more on the body type of the individual in question
instead of whether or not their hands are heavier. Unofficial exit interviews with some
participants offer anecdotal evidence. As one participant stated “I’m too fat to do that,”
(Participant 211, personal interview, July 25th, 2010). Pulling a lever downwards
estimates may have also been based more on body type than on weighted hands. Should
an individual be more athletic and muscular in nature, he or she might find the action to
be easier than a hypothetical 80 pound weakling. Of course, the apparent ease of the task
might also be dependant upon what type of lever and individual pictured – whether it is
large or small, rusted or in precise working order.
While estimates on “Reciting the ABC’s backwards” should not be affected by
body type, it can easily be affected by estimates of one’s own or the other person’s
intelligence. The perceived differences in body type and intelligence will be briefly
addressed in the next subsection. However, should the Effort Inventory have worked in
the way it was meant to, those differences should not have played a large part in the
variance of the scores.
The basic idea behind the Effort Inventory was to create a list of easy to imagine
items, falling under the larger categories of “Easier”, “Harder”, or “No Different” with
weights. The “Harder” category succeeded by taking everyday actions that the participant
could imagine. The “No Difference” category partially succeeds. “Stomping your feet
while sitting” and “Counting to 100 by 5s” are both simple tasks that can be easily

71

imagined (though it may have been better to change “Counting to 100 by 5s” to
“Counting to 100 by 10s”, based on participant reactions). “Reciting the ABC’s
backwards” however, is not an everyday task, nor, judging by the laughter that occurred
when many participants read this item4, an easy one. The “Easier” category shows the
most difficulty in translating the pilot test results to actual usage. “Flattening a Styrofoam
cup against a table” and “Pulling a lever downwards” may both be considered as obtuse
items that may not always be encountered in everyday life. “Bending at the waist and
reaching down for your toes” may be more affected by body type than weights. Should
the inventory be kept, the entire category would need reworked. Perhaps it would be
better to have a directly contrasting item for each item in the “Harder with Weights”
category. For example, to contract “Holding your hands over your head” an item like
“Standing and keeping your arms down at your sides” could be included. Such a method
would create a more direct dichotomy between actions that may be easier to interpret.
Perhaps a lesser problem with the Effort Inventory is that it is all based on
prospective action of the self and the other. It might be beneficial to have each participant
perform the action associated with each item, instead of just thinking about doing it
themselves before rating the effort the other person would have to the same item. Such
procedural changes would have the added benefit of simplifying the data without the
need of manipulation. By asking the participant to rate, on a scale of -5 to 5, the
difference in effort the other person would have to exert, the scores could be used directly
in analysis.

4

Again, this is based on anecdotal evidence retrieved from the experimenter’s memory.
No data on laughter were actually recorded.
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4.2.3. Participants
Physical differences
Another possible confound is the widely varying degree of participants. The way
the Effort Inventory is set up, it assumes that pairs of participants will be relatively
similar in abilities, body type, and intelligence levels. Such similarity does not prove to
be the case in actual practice, especially when relying on a convenience sampling that
makes use of volunteers and undergraduate students. When a two-hundred and fifty
pound participant is paired with a one-hundred and forty-five pound participant, obvious
differences in abilities become apparent, even without the introduction of the weights.
While doing so can add to external validity, physical differences between participants
have a negative impact on the internal validity of the study. It becomes necessary to ask
how much of the difference in ratings are a part of the handicap and how much is part of
the large difference in size between participants. While innate physical differences
between participants is not as large a problem as those evidenced in the Effort Inventory,
it should addressed before any further study is undertaken. As is often the case with
psychological studies in the academic world, it is difficult to control who and how many
will participate while still gathering enough participants to make the study worthwhile.
Even going outside of traditional recruitment may yield similar results if one relies on a
sample of whoever is willing to volunteer for a psychological study.
Prior knowledge
One more issue with participants is that of prior knowledge of the other member
of the dyad. Due to the fact that the experiment utilized convenience samples (again,
either of volunteers or of undergraduate students who needed participation for a course
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requirement), often when two individuals would participate in the experiment together,
they were previous friends with prior knowledge of the other and their abilities. In theory,
prior knowledge could be controlled with a more rigid sign up procedure; however, in
practice it is doubtful that there would have been enough participants to make it
worthwhile as a study unless some larger form of compensation than course requirement
was involved. When utilizing the population of undergraduates, it was found that simply
requesting two participants at a time led to a small number of participants who were
willing or able to participate in an experimental session5. The use of confederates
through much of the data pool helped minimize this possible confound and data show no
significant difference between individuals paired with confederates and individuals
paired with another naïve participant.
If the study is to be reexamined, it is suggested that confederates be used for all
sessions. The use of confederates will decrease the variability in conditions of collecting
data and, through the use of a single confederate for males and a single confederate for
females, same sex dyads will be created with ease. While the current study found no
difference between the same sex and the mixed sex dyads on any data of interested, it is
recognized that uniformity in dyads would decrease the number of possible confounds.
Confederates will also make data collection simpler by only relying on one participant at
the time.
4.2.4 Procedure order
The procedure order may also need to be examined. In the current study,
participants performed the interaction task, then filled out demographics, then answered
5

It should be noted that many who did sign up for a session ignored this request and were
asked to leave in the end, without data being gathered.
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the Task Interaction Manipulation Survey, then provided estimates for both their own and
the other’s estimated amount of effort needed to complete the items on the Effort
Inventory. Two main issues should be examined regarding the current procedure.
First, by ordering the procedure as it was, not only did this create time for
memory loss between the Interaction Task and the Effort Inventory, but it may have also
inadvertently primed participants to think about themselves while filling out the
demographics and could have affected participant’s estimates while answering the Effort
Inventory. It may make more sense in the future to collect demographic data before
participants meet each other or, at the very least, before the Interaction Task.
Secondly, the way the Effort Inventory was displayed for the participants
involved a spreadsheet with the action items listed with two columns beside it, one for
estimates of the self and one for estimates of the other (see Appendix C). It may be more
beneficial to the scientific process to separate estimates for oneself and estimates for the
other into two separate sheets. These sheets should be counterbalanced across
participants. With such a procedure, any accidental priming of the participant to think
about either himself or herself or to think about the other would have less of a chance of
being manifested in the data.
4.3 Importance of the Work
It may be that the use of too many untested methods to support the hypotheses
was a little too ambitious for the study at hand. Multiple issues were identified. It is
unfortunate that these flaws resulted with no firm support or refutation of the hypotheses
to be made, however it is only by implementing the methodology that we realize where
the flaws within it lie, as well as possible ways of strengthening it.
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It may still be argued that the ability to take another’s perspective is important for
social interaction. While putting oneself in the physical frame of another may not open
the doorway to a new era of love and peace with one’s fellow man, it is a step in the
ability to understand another person. Understanding could be especially important if the
other person is handicapped in some way. By understanding one’s limitations, and
potential for action, it is possible that understanding of one’s behavior may start
following suit. Other studies have suggested that taking the perspective of another person
allows an individual to have a better chance of understanding and anticipating the
reactions and behavior of that person (Block-Lerner, Adair, Plumb, Rhatigan, & Orsillo,
2007). While understanding and anticipating others in would not equate to empathy by
themselves, they may help an individual along that path. By understanding the behavior
of another person, it may be possible to more easily develop a sense of kinship with that
person. At the very least Block-Lerner et al. (2007) suggest that perspective taking
creates an advantage for developing stronger interpersonal relationships.
A stronger interpersonal relationship can, in theory, lead to lower levels of
violence. Mohr, Howells, Gerace, Day, and Wharton (2007) suggest that the ability to
take the perspective of another may affect anger responses by inhibiting their rise to
provocation. Mohr et al. (2007) explain that inhibiting provocation could happen in two
ways: by the individual being able to maintain a “high level of cognitive functioning
when aroused by interpersonal provocation” (p. 509) and by the perspective taking ability
leading a better attribution of the situation, thereby lessening the chances of blame being
linked to any provocation (Mohr et al., 2007). Admittedly, this is more than a simple, step
by step progression, but it is believed that this study has helped the progression.
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APPENDIX A

Basic Demographic Information and Health Questionnaire
Adapted from Slifkin (2008).

Age _______________________________

Date of Birth _______________________

Weight _____________________________

Height ____________________________

Hand Dominance _____________________

Sex

Do you wear corrective lenses? Yes

Are you wearing them today? Yes

No

_____________________________

Do you have any neurological or psychiatric disorders?

Yes

No

No

If yes, please explain:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Are you taking any medication?

Yes

No

If yes, please explain:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Do you have any difficulties using either of your two hands?

Yes

No

If yes, please explain:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX B
Interaction Task Manipulation Check

Instructions:

Please rate how true of you the following statements are.
1.

I felt I had to cooperate with the other person
Completely Agree
Agree
Disagree
Completely Disagree

2.

I felt I had to compete against the other person
Completely Agree
Agree
Disagree
Completely Disagree

3.

I did not feel as if I had to cooperate with the other person
or compete against the other person
Completely Agree
Agree
Disagree
Completely Disagree
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APPENDIX C

Effort Inventory
Instructions: In the third part of this study you and the other person in this study will be
asked to perform many of the following actions. Please read each of the items carefully and
take a twenty seconds to imagine yourself or the other person actually performing these
upcoming actions. Please use the below scale to rate how much effort you believe it will
take for each of you to perform these actions. Remember, the individual wearing the
weights previously will be wearing them again for this part of the study.
1
2
3
4
5
no effort -----------------------------------------------------a lot of effort
Action

You

1

Stomping your feet while sitting

2

Holding your hands over your head

3

Counting to 100 by 5s

4

Bending at the waist and reaching
down for your toes

5

Eating with a spoon

6

Pulling a lever downwards

7

Reciting the ABC's backwards

8

Flattening a Styrofoam cup against a
table

9

Brushing your teeth
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The Other
Person

